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Why Emerging Managers Struggle to Raise Their First Fund (Even When the Strategy Is Good)

Emerging managers rarely misunderstand how hard fundraising will be. Most walk into the process knowing they will hear “no” far more often than “yes.” What they underestimate — almost universally — is why it’s so hard, and what specific frictions slow them down even when the underlying strategy is strong.
A Fund I or Fund II raise is not simply a test of strategy, pedigree, or past experience. It’s a test of timing, narrative clarity, emotional resilience, and the ability to make LPs remember the right three things when they talk about you later. What derails most emerging managers is not the absence of quality. It’s the presence of avoidable misunderstandings about how LPs actually make judgments in the early stages.
This post breaks down the structural reasons emerging managers struggle, based on hundreds of fundraises and a fair number of lessons learned the hard way.
1. The Starting-Point Illusion: Pedigree and Past Deals Don’t Travel as Well as GPs Expect
Many emerging managers assume that their resumes and prior deal experience will do more of the heavy lifting than they actually can. Pedigree is useful — it gets attention and establishes general credibility — but it is rarely persuasive on its own. LPs are not allocating to résumés. They are allocating to the future ability of a team to execute a strategy with discipline.
Past deals present an even more nuanced challenge. Most emerging managers cannot claim attribution for their prior firm’s investments, which means they cannot present those transactions as formal track record. They can gesture toward them, contextualize them, and weave them into the narrative, but LPs understand the distinction between experience in the ecosystem and ownership of outcomes. Without attribution, deal history tends to function more as background color than as evidence, and emerging managers often overestimate its persuasive power.
In other words, pedigree and past deals help — but only when they support a clear, forward-looking story. They are not the story.
2. What LPs Actually Perceive (and Why It Surprises Emerging Managers)
Emerging managers tend to assume that if they explain their strategy thoroughly, LPs will come away with a firm grasp of who they are and what makes them distinct. In reality, LPs are scanning for a small number of memorable, repeatable ideas — something they can summarize to a colleague in a hallway conversation later.
This creates a simple test:
Can someone who is not an expert describe your strategy in three sentences, without losing the plot?
Most emerging managers dramatically overestimate how well their complexity will travel. What they see as essential nuance often becomes noise. What they see as obvious differentiation often blends into a category LPs perceive as crowded.
LPs are not dismissive; they are overloaded. The burden falls on the GP to create a story that is not just accurate but portable — something that survives outside the room.
3. The Timing Problem: Everything Takes Longer Than Anyone Admits
The other major underestimation is timing. Not just in the sense of “fundraising takes longer than we thought,” but in the deeper sense that momentum develops slowly, unevenly, and often invisibly for long stretches.
Fund I and Fund II fundraises almost never follow a neat pipeline. They move in fits and starts. At BKM Capital Partners in 2014, the expectation was a $25–50 million anchor from friends and family. Instead, those channels produced a fraction of that amount. The turning point was a single meeting with a Scandinavian LP who happened to be in Los Angeles for one day. We were taking twenty meetings a week. That was the one that mattered.
The lesson wasn’t that we mis-executed. The lesson was that the path is nonlinear. You can influence consistency and preparation; you cannot choreograph when conviction arrives or from where. Emerging managers almost always underestimate the lag between doing the work and seeing the results.
4. A Lesson From BKM: Compression, Clarity, and the Danger of Taking Too Long to Get to the Point
The experience at BKM also revealed another common challenge: emerging managers often bury the lead of their own strategy. The multitenant industrial thesis was compelling, differentiated, and, as it turned out, highly scalable. But it took twelve slides to explain why. Looking back, there was probably a three- or four-slide version of the same argument that would have landed more powerfully.
Part of the issue was communicative style. The founder, Brian Malliet, was a deeply capable operator with an instinct for detail and precision. His explanations were thorough, logical, and grounded in fact — but not distilled. At the time, I didn’t push back as strongly as I would today. Now, after a decade of seeing how LPs actually process information, it’s clear that emerging managers often undermine themselves by overexplaining.
Compression is not simplification; it is discipline. It forces clarity about what truly matters, and it respects the LP’s cognitive load. Emerging managers who master compression tend to gain traction faster because they surface the essence of their strategy instead of making LPs work to find it.
5. The Market Is Often Wrong About What’s “Investable”
One of the most valuable lessons from working across strategies is that consensus about what is “institutionally investable” is often temporary. LPs misjudge this just as frequently as GPs do.
Examples are everywhere:
- In the 1990s, corporate divestitures were considered unattractive, yet Platinum Equity built an entire franchise by acquiring orphaned divisions that nobody else wanted.
- In 2014, multitenant industrial was widely viewed as too operational and too messy — yet BKM turned that stigma into outperformance.
- Entire categories that were once considered fringe or non-scalable have since become mainstream allocation themes.
The takeaway is not that every contrarian idea is good. It’s that the market’s current beliefs about what is or isn’t “institutional” should not be treated as permanent truths. Many emerging managers overcorrect by trying to present themselves as consensus-aligned, when in fact their edge may lie in something the market does not yet fully appreciate.
6. The Emotional Reality: Fund I Is Mostly Rejection, and That’s Normal
The final underestimation is emotional. Fund I requires hearing “no” far more times than most people have prepared themselves for. When I was raising for BKM, it was surprising how similar the emotional cadence felt to building Darien Group years later. In both cases, you had to pitch a dozen prospects to get one serious conversation.
Rejection at this stage is not diagnostic. It is structural.
The challenge is not to avoid rejection; it is to persist long enough that the small percentage of conversations with real potential can actually happen.
Closing Thoughts
Emerging managers don’t struggle because they lack intelligence, experience, or ambition. They struggle because they misjudge what LPs truly react to: timing, clarity, memory, simplicity, and legitimacy. These are solvable problems, but only if GPs understand the dynamics at play.
A strong strategy is necessary.A clear story is differentiating.But the managers who break through are the ones who recognize that Fund I is not a referendum on their potential — it is the beginning of a longer institutional arc, one shaped as much by discipline as by opportunity.


